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Process Theory and Emerging
Thirteenth Amendment Jurisprudence:
The Case of Agricultural
Guestworkers
By BENJAMIN P. QUEST*
A RESURGENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL scholarship on the Thir-
teenth Amendment' has been emerging since the 1950s. In 1951, Ja-
cobus tenBroek argued that courts could construe the Constitution's
ban on slavery as not only an attack upon compulsory servitude but
also as an assault on the harms and legacies associated with slavery.2
The Supreme Court adopted this view a decade later and held that
the Thirteenth Amendment authorized Congress to eliminate purely
private acts of racial discrimination in housing sales as a legacy of slav-
ery.3 Lea VanderVelde has explored the legislative record of the Thir-
teenth Amendment and concluded that nineteenth-century legislators
envisioned the harms and legacies of slavery as more than the elimina-
tion of race-based involuntary servitude.4 Many nineteenth-century
legislators viewed the Thirteenth Amendment as establishing mini-
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1. U.S. CONsTr. amend. XIII. The Thirteenth Amendment states that "[n]either slav-
ery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
Id.
2. Jacobus tenBroek, The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States:
Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CAL. L. REV. 171, 172-73
(1951).
3. Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439-41 (1968) (referring to the harms and lega-
cies associated with slavery as "badges and incidents" of slavery).
4. Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
437, 495 (1989).
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mum labor standards applicable to all workers inside the United
States.5
James Pope demonstrates that early twentieth-century workers
also viewed the Thirteenth Amendment as fashioning a broad range
of labor rights. 6 Also focusing on labor, Maria Ontiveros critiques the
denial of back pay for undocumented victims of labor violations as a
legal sanction of unequal labor rights between undocumented and
documented workers and, hence, a violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment.7 Others look beyond the labor arena and advocate for
an interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment that pushes Congress
to enact a sweeping range of federal civil-rights legislation.8 This Com-
ment adds to the debate by applying process theory9 as a limiting prin-
ciple to an expansive substantive interpretation of the Thirteenth
Amendment and uses United States agricultural guestworker policy10
as a case study. Viewed through a process theory lens, the Thirteenth
Amendment compels Congress to revise guestworker l a statutes since
guestworkers are unable to take advantage of democratic channels to
combat employment practices that replicate slavery-like harms.' 2
Process theory interprets the Constitution as mainly providing
procedural mandates rather than enumerating substantive rights. 13 Al-
though the theory is commonly associated with judicial review, this
Comment advocates its use as a congressional guide to identify and
5. See id. at 451-52.
6. James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 942 (1997).
7. Maria L. Ontiveros, Immigrant Workers' Rights in a Post-Hoffman World-Organizing
Around the Thirteenth Amendment, 18 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 651, 651 (2004).
8. Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom: Civil Rights & the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, 45 B.C. L. Rav. 307, 307 (2004).
9. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 74, 80,
87 (Harvard Univ. Press 1980). Process theory is ajudicial theory that interprets the Consti-
tution as mandating intensified judicial scrutiny where history and common sense demon-
strate a procedural breakdown in individual and collective political processes. Id.
10. "Guestworker policy" refers to both the historical and present practice of lawfully
employing non-citizens to temporarily work in the United States. See Cindy Hahamovitch,
Creating Perfect Immigrants: Guestworkers of the World in Historical Perspective, 44 LAB. HISTORY
69, 70 n.1 (2003) ("In the last 40 years, state-authorized, temporary foreign workers have
come to be known collectively as 'guestworkers.'").
11. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(H) (1) (b) (West
2005) (authorizing and establishing the requirements under which U.S. employers may
hire guestworkers). See also U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, http://
www.uscis.gov/graphics/services/tempbenefits/TempWorker.htm (last visited Sept. 5,
2006) (discussing the procedures for lawfully employing temporary foreign workers).
12. SeeJones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438-41 (1968). "Slavery-like harms" refers to
the badges and incidents of slavery mentioned in Jones. Id.
13. See ELY, supra note 9, at 88-101.
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limit those situations calling for legislative action under Section Two
of the Thirteenth Amendment.1 4 Instead of asking whether a funda-
mental right is at stake, process theory inquires whether the underly-
ing procedures giving rise to legal relationships are fair. 1 5 Under
circumstances where discrete and insular minorities are unable to pro-
tect their interests through conventional democratic channels, pro-
cess theory requires heightened governmental scrutiny.' 6
Part I of this Comment examines the substantive scope of the
Thirteenth Amendment by looking at the legislative debates during
the Amendment's creation as well as subsequent Thirteenth Amend-
ment case law. Although commoditization and family unity concerns;
labor, political, and citizenship rights; freedom of movement; and, ul-
timately, liberty lie at the Thirteenth Amendment's core, this Com-
ment does not argue that all laws that interfere with these rights
offend the Thirteenth Amendment. Rather, Part II introduces process
theory17 as a constitutional interpretive guide and limiting principle
to help Congress resolve when to invoke the Thirteenth Amendment.
In borderline cases exhibiting abuses that the Thirteenth Amendment
potentially prohibits, process theory tips the balance in favor of legisla-
tion pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment.
Next, Part III presents two interrelated Thirteenth Amendment
borderline cases involving guestworkers: the mid-twentieth century
Bracero Program1 8 and the current United States agricultural
guestworker program. This section shows that guestworkers have been
and still are a vulnerable, insular, and discrete minority.19 Applying
process theory, the minority status of guestworkers merits heightened
congressional review of guestworker programs. This section also dem-
onstrates that past and present guestworker programs create labor sit-
uations that replicate slavery's harms, interfering with substantive
rights protected by the Thirteenth Amendment. Subject to height-
ened scrutiny, these discredited labor situations demand congres-
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (authorizing Congress to enforce the prohibition of
slavery and involuntary servitude, except as punishment for a duly convicted offense, by
"appropriate legislation").
15. See ELY, supra note 9, at 74.
16. See id.; see also James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 211, 228 (1993) (describing Ely's process theory as requiring judicial review to ensure
that political communication and participation remain open and to guarantee that such
processes are free of prejudice against discrete and insular minorities).
17. See ELY, supra note 9.
18. Deborah Cohen, Caught in the Middle: The Mexican State's Relationship with the United
States and Its Own Citizen-Workers, 1942-1954, 2001 J. A-M. ETHNIC HISTOR' 110 (2001).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 142-43, 181-89.
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sional reform pursuant to Section Two of the Thirteenth
Amendment.
Lastly, this Comment concludes by proposing that Congress enact
guestworker legislation, pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment, that
guarantees guestworker participation during the creation of
guestworker employment programs.
I. The Thirteenth Amendment Enables Congress to Eliminate
the Lingering Badges and Incidents of Slavery and
Involuntary Servitude
Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment states: "Neither slav-
ery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."20 Section
Two declares: "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation."2 1
The Thirteenth Amendment recognizes the substantive right to
be free from both slavery and involuntary servitude. 22 Interpreting the
Amendment, however, raises many questions, as it is far from clear
what "slavery" or "involuntary servitude" mean. 23 Nor is it readily ap-
parent what constitutes the "existence" of slavery or what sort of "ap-
propriate legislation" is necessary to eradicate slavery and involuntary
servitude.
Black's Law Dictionary defines slavery as a "situation in which one
person has absolute power over the life, fortune, and liberty of an-
other"24 and describes involuntary servitude as "[t]he condition of
one forced to labor-for pay or not-for another by coercion or im-
prisonment."25 Although academics have criticized these definitions
as incomplete,2 6 the Supreme Court's interpretation of involuntary
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
21. Id. § 2.
22. Id.
23. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988).
24. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1402 (8th ed. 2004).
25. Id. at 1422.
26. Criticizing this definition of slavery, academics have emphasized that owners
never exercised absolute control over their slaves. See ROBERTJ. STEINFELD, COERCION, CON-
TRACT, AND FREE LABOR IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 7 (Christopher Tomlins ed., 2001).
Although sanctions were too often swift and cruel, American slaves regularly interrupted
work production at critical moments as a means to usurp power and bargain for better
labor conditions. See id. Likewise, labor scholar Robert Steinfeld has criticized the legal
definition of involuntary servitude as too absolute, characterizing the difference between
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servitude and slavery in United States v. Kozminski was even more re-
strictive. 27 There, the Court referred to involuntary servitude as forced
labor through threat of physical or legal punishment 28-not through
mere psychological coercion-and defined slavery as a narrow subset
of involuntary servitude. 29
The definitions of involuntary servitude and slavery in Kozminski
apply primarily to Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment.3 0
Thus, the holding in Jones v. Meyer Co. 3 1 that Congress may enact "ap-
propriate legislation" to stamp out the "badges and incidents" of slav-
ery and involuntary servitude under Section Two of the Thirteenth
Amendment, has not been curtailed by subsequent jurisprudence. 32
Legislative debates during the drafting of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment support the proposition that Section Two of the Thirteenth
Amendment empowers Congress to eliminate not only slavery, but
commoditization of humans, lack of labor rights, conditions hostile to
family maintenance, restraints to free movement, exclusion from the
political process, and an outright ban on citizenship.3 3 This Comment
briefly reviews the legislative discussion surrounding the Thirteenth
Amendment as a starting point to assess slavery's badges and inci-
dents. When conditions that invoke process theory appear and a sig-
nificant number of harms associated with slavery arise, the Thirteenth
Amendment directs Congress to take action.
A. Nineteenth-century Legislators Envisioned the Thirteenth
Amendment as a Means to Guarantee Labor, Family,
and Political Rights
The Amendment's drafters perceived human commoditization-
treating people as property34-as one of slavery's more pernicious
vices. For example, Massachusetts Representative Charles Sumner
stated that "traffic in human beings, as an article of 'commerce among
voluntary and involuntary servitude as a continuum contingent upon varying degrees of
economic and physical coercion. Id. at 8.
27. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 952.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 938-41.
31. 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (holding that the Thirteenth Amendment authorized Con-
gress to eliminate purely private racial discrimination in housing sales as a legacy of
slavery).
32. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 951.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 34-43.
34. See Ontiveros, supra note 7, at 674.
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States,' [should] be extirpated."35 Representative John Farnsworth of
Illinois remarked: "[God] gave man dominion over things animate
and inanimate, He established property. Nowhere do you read that
He gave man dominion over another man. '36 These statements de-
nounced commoditization as reducing humans to property and equat-
ing people with commercial objects. 3 7 In the extreme, regarding
humans as a commodity leads to a complete deprivation of liberty, as
human well-being and freedom are cast aside for pecuniary gain.
Proponents of the Thirteenth Amendment also viewed the poor
labor condition of unreasonable wages as a constraint upon liberty
and part and parcel of slavery.38 Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proc-
lamation condemns slavery as smothering the possibility to "[1]abor
faithfully for reasonable wages." 39 Inadequate daily compensation se-
verely limits individual freedom by binding one to the continual task
of surviving. As Ebon Ingersoll, Representative from Illinois, opined,
"[the black man] has a right to live, and live in a state of freedom....
He has a right to till the soil, to earn his bread by the sweat of his
brow, and enjoy the rewards of his own labor."40 Ingersoll's statement
underscores the notion that reasonable wages for labor are a founda-
tional condition for freedom and liberty. A systemic failure to provide
reasonable wages deprives laborers of freedom, constituting a badge
and incident of slavery.
Ingersoll also found slavery reprehensible because it decimated
the nuclear family.41 Slavery separated husbands from their wives and
mothers from their children, leaving whole segments of society with-
35. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1482 (1864), reprinted in STATUTORY HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES CIVIL RIGHTS: PART I 82 (Bernard Schwartz ed., Chelsea House
1970).
36. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1865), reprinted in STATUTORY HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES CIVIL RIGHTS: PART 1 91 (Bernard Schwartz ed., Chelsea House 1970).
37. Id. See also Ontiveros, supra note 7, at 674 (critiquing the denial of back pay for
undocumented victims of labor violations as a legal sanction of unequal labor rights be-
tween undocumented and documented workers and, hence, a violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment).
38. STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CIVIL RIGHTS: PART I 25-96 (Bernard
Schwartz ed., Chelsea House 1970).
39. President Abraham Lincoln, The Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863) (ex-
cerpts available in STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CIVIL RIGHTS: PART I 23 (Ber-
nard Schwartz ed., Chelsea House 1970)).
40. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2990 (1864), reprinted in STATUTORY HISTORY
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out the "right to the endearments and enjoyment of family ties. ' '4 2
Whether viewed as an egregious effect of commoditization or a sepa-
rate horror of slavery, forced familial separation severs the passing of
love, affection, and intellectual capital from one generation to the
next. Also, the absence of such love and knowledge limits child devel-
opment, creating an entire class of persons poorly equipped to suc-
ceed in society. This perpetuates the damaging illusion that certain
communities are inherently ill-suited for success in America. The ster-
eotype of a group predisposition for failure breeds racism, which in
turn is used to justify slavery, creating a legacy that is difficult to
reverse.
In addition to familial separation, the drafters of the Thirteenth
Amendment understood that slavery restrained free movement for
both African-Americans enslaved in the South and those who were
free in the North. 43 For southern African-Americans, their owners
controlled their movement.44 In the North, "[t]wenty million free
men ... were practically reduced to the condition of semi-citizens of
the United States: for the enjoyment of their rights, privileges, and
immunities as citizens depended upon a perpetual residence north of
Mason and Dixon's line. ''45 In this way, limitations on African-Ameri-
can mobility in the nineteenth century constituted yet another badge
and incident of slavery.
Slavery also robbed African-Americans of a panoply of political
rights. Slaves could not vote, participate, or play any meaningful role
in the political process.46 Slavery barred African-Americans from effec-
tively accessing the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. 47
Forced bondage silenced the voices of slaves regarding any policy af-
fecting their ability to seek dignified work and maintain family cohe-
sion. At best, African-Americans were represented by benevolent
politicians who had never personally experienced the plight of slaves.
At worst, they were represented by politicians who viewed their contin-
ued wealth and power as contingent on the maintenance of chattel
slavery.
42. Id.
43. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202-03 (1864), reprinted in STATUTORY




46. See Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
47. See id.
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Thirteenth Amendment opponent William Kelley feared that
slavery's death entailed "the negro [as] a free citizen . . . protected
everywhere, in defiance of existing State constitutions and
laws ... and ... the negro [as] a voting citizen." 48 Kelley's fears rein-
force the argument that Thirteenth Amendment proponents desired
to confer political and citizenship rights upon African-Americans and
viewed the absence of such rights as a badge and incident of slavery.49
The legislative discussion leading to the Thirteenth Amendment
illuminates the drafters' understanding of the badges and incidents of
slavery. Legislators believed that the evils associated with slavery en-
compassed economic, labor, familial, political, and citizenship abuses,
as well as constraints on mobility. The drafters desired to eliminate
the conditions of the "worst off working man. '50 Their views serve as a
guide for current legislators in determining which abuses to combat
pursuant to Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment.
B. Case Law Extended the Scope of the Thirteenth Amendment
Beyond the Context of African-American Enslavement,
Authorizing Congress to Abolish Not Only
Slavery and Involuntary Servitude, but
Also Its Badges and Incidents
As envisioned by nineteenth-century legislators, the Thirteenth
Amendment protected African-Americans from commoditization, la-
bor abuse, family disruption, restraints on mobility, and the denial of
political and citizenship rights. At the very least, it mandated an end
to African-American enslavement in the United States. At the close of
the Civil War, whether the judiciary would construe the Thirteenth
Amendment as applying to other groups remained unanswered.
Congress was the first to act. Under the authority of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, Congress crafted legislation to prohibit slavery-
like abuses within labor arrangements. 5 1 In 1867, for example, Con-
48. See STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CIVL RIGHTS: PART I 50 (Bernard
Schwartz ed., Chelsea House 1970).
49. See infra Part II.B. The claim that the absolute denial of citizenship and political
ights represents a badge and incident of slavery has particular relevance to legally-sanc-
tioned immigrant labor. This Comment argues that through a process theory lens,
guestworker abuses demand congressional action pursuant to Section Two of the Thir-
teenth Amendment. Professor Maria Ontiveros has discussed with the author that regard-
less of any procedural flaws in the creation of guestworker programs, some guestworker
abuses directly implicate the Thirteenth Amendment.
50. VanderVelde, supra note 4, at 495-96.
51. See Ontiveros, supra note 7, at 660.
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gress outlawed the New Mexico territory's labor system that forced
debtors to work in order to pay off their debt.52 Five years later, the
Supreme Court indirectly reinforced Congress's action in New Mexico
in the Slaughter-House Cases.53 Despite rejecting the plaintiffs claim
that Louisiana's regulation of privately-owned slaughterhouses vio-
lated the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court expanded the Amend-
ment's reach by declaring that it could regulate labor conditions
beyond those associated with African slavery.54 The Court specified
that "the language and spirit" of the Thirteenth Amendment encom-
passed both the "Mexican peonage or the Chinese Coolie labor sys-
tem '55 and emphasized that the Amendment aimed to remedy
slavery's evils and not just slavery itself.56 The Thirteenth Amendment
permitted Congress to effectuate American aspirations of racial equal-
ity, basic labor rights, and liberty after the Civil War.5 7
Early Thirteenth Amendmentjurisprudence thus established aju-
dicial concern with the horrors of slavery, regardless of race.58 Equally
significant, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment,59 the Court applied
the Thirteenth Amendment to private and not solely public matters,
expanding the scope of the Amendment beyond other constitutional
provisions that combat civil-rights violations.60
The Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of certain private la-
bor arrangements, regardless of race, was reaffirmed in Bailey v. Ala-
bama.61 In Bailey, a 1903 Alabama statute rendered the failure to
perform a labor contract without repaying an advance in salary as
prima facie evidence of intent to defraud, and made it punishable by
forced labor.62 The law did not permit an employee to testify and re-
but this presumption unless he could marshal outside evidence to the
contrary.63 The Supreme Court declared that Alabama's statute vio-
52. See id.
53. 83 U.S. 36 (1873); see also Ontiveros, supra note 7, at 659.
54. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 72; see also Ontiveros, supra note 7, at 659.
55. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 72.
56. Id.
57. Ontiveros, supra note 7, at 659-62.
58. See id.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
60. See Tsesis, supra note 8, at 311.
61. 219 U.S. 219 (1911). Bailey involved labor contracts where an employee could
receive money up front to work for a fixed period. Id. at 228-30. If an employee quit
without paying back the advanced sum, Alabama statute permitted the employer to compel
the employee to work "involuntarily" until the debt was paid off. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 236.
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lated the Thirteenth Amendment. 6 4 The Court reasoned that one
could subvert the Thirteenth Amendment if, under the guise of con-
tract law, employers could enforce compulsory labor where the em-
ployer had allotted payment advances. 6 5 The Court then concluded
that the moment one compels another to work against his will, invol-
untary servitude begins. 66 The opinion underscored the idea that
compelled labor is no less involuntary simply because the original em-
ployment agreement was freely negotiated. 67 Narrowly construed, Bai-
ley confirms little more than a racially neutral proscription of specific
performance in labor contracts.68 Nonetheless, prominent dicta
within the opinion characterizes the Thirteenth Amendment as a
charter of universal freedom designed to "abolish slavery of whatever
name and form and all its badges and incidents. '69
In the 1968 case Jones v. Mayer Co.,70 the Court referenced lan-
guage discussing slavery's badges and incidents from past cases to sup-
port its central argument that the Thirteenth Amendment grants
Congress the authority to determine the badges and incidents of slav-
ery. 71 Applying this rule to the facts of the case, the Court held that
the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits nationwide private-housing dis-
crimination aimed at African-Americans. 72 The Court utilized re-
search by Jacobus tenBroek, 73 noting that the drafters of the
Thirteenth Amendment envisioned Section Two as sanctioning a wide
range of positive governmental action to protect the descendants of
former slaves.7 4 In Jones, the Court declared that racially motivated
restraints upon fundamental rights, such as buying and selling prop-
erty, epitomize the badges and incidents of slavery.75
Recent judicial opinion has left untouched the Jones deference
toward congressional action to define and combat the badges and in-
cidents of slavery, while at the same time limiting the types of practices
that constitute involuntary servitude to physical or lawful coercion. 7 6
64. Id. at 245.
65. Id. at 242.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 244-45.
69. Id. at 241.
70. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
71. Id. at 438-44.
72. Id. at 439-41.
73. See id. at 429 n.46.
74. Id. at 440.
75. Id. at 441.
76. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944 (1988).
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The majority in Kozminski feared that including psychological coer-
cion within the definition of involuntary servitude would give rise to
Thirteenth Amendment claims involving religious indoctrination and
family issues that have little in common with slavery's legacy.77 Even
within the tailored definition of involuntary servitude given in Kozmin-
ski, the Court specifically noted that "it is possible that threaten-
ing ... an immigrant with deportation could constitute the threat of
legal coercion that induces involuntary servitude.
78
In sum, the Thirteenth Amendment embodies familial, political,
and citizenship rights, as well as the right to be free from commodi-
tization and other labor abuses. Early congressional action following
the Amendment's ratification demonstrates that Congress viewed it as
a legislative grant to eradicate abuses associated with slavery and invol-
untary servitude. Moreover, Supreme Court precedent signals judicial
approval of the Amendment's use outside of the African-American
context and of Congress' authority to determine current manifesta-
tions of the badges and incidents of slavery pursuant to the Thirteenth
Amendment. Jones and otherjudicial opinions from the twentieth cen-
tury also emphasize that the Thirteenth Amendment did not become
irrelevant with the eradication of African-American chattel slavery. Ex-
pansively interpreting Jones, Congress could strike down laws that in-
fringe upon. fundamental rights, such as political participation or
collective bargaining, as badges and incidents of slavery.
II. Process Theory Establishes Parameters for Congressional
Action Under Section Two of the Thirteenth
Amendment
Although the Thirteenth Amendment extends beyond incidents
directly analogous to American slavery, the precise scope of the Thir-
teenth Amendment is still unclear. Process theory can assist Congress
in determining the badges and incidents of slavery in the twenty-first
century. Process theory interprets the Constitution as mandating in-
tensified judicial scrutiny where history and common sense demon-
strate a breakdown in popular democracy. 79 Instead of inquiring
whether a fundamental right is at stake, process theory asks whether
the foundational procedures establishing legal relationships are fair.80
77. See id. at 943-44, 964 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 967 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
78. Id. at 948.
79. See ELY, supra note 9, at 74, 80, 87.
80. Id. at 74.
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Unfair scenarios often arise where discrete and insular minorities are
unable to protect themselves from majority-driven oppressive mea-
sures through conventional democratic mechanisms.8 Although com-
monly viewed as a judicial tool, this Comment advocates using process
theory as a legislative guide to identify situations that may constitute a
badge and incident of slavery demanding action under Section Two of
the Thirteenth Amendment. Where the victims of labor abuse are un-
able to affect change through conventional democratic channels,
Congress should abolish those abuses that implicate wage, familial,
political, and citizenship concerns.8 2
A. Past Legislation, Judicial History, and an Originalist
Interpretation of the Constitution Offer Inadequate
Guidance to Thirteenth Amendment
Congressional Action
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits abuses that deny basic lib-
erties.83 However, blanket protection of familial, labor, political, and
citizenship rights without parameters leads to regulations beyond the
scope of the Thirteenth Amendment. Military deployments in foreign
countries over multiple years divide families. Economic strains cause
many Americans to feel trapped, unable to leave theirjobs or relocate.
Laws permitting surrogate pregnancy and legalized prostitution com-
moditize women's bodies. Even though these practices replicate some
of slavery's harms,84 neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has ar-
gued that they violate the Thirteenth Amendment. 85 The thrust of
judicial opinion suggests that the badges and incidents of slavery likely
involve fundamental rights86 as well as some level of coercion compel-
ling one to participate or remain in a given situation.87 Nevertheless,
the legislative history and judicial opinions, without the additional
guidance of process theory, do not adequately settle whether current
scenarios exhibiting slavery-like abuse require congressional action
pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment.
Applying the Thirteenth Amendment by exclusively adhering to
the legislative intent, as an originalist might, forces one to prioritize
81. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
82. See supra Part I.A.
83. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873); see alsoJones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
84. See supra Part I.
85. See supra Part I.
86. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 441.
87. See Bailey, 219 U.S. at 219.
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between potentially conflicting legislative documents. Whether con-
gressional action pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment must impli-
cate one, some, or all of the substantive issues that legislators discuss is
unclear. One has to discern whether the views of various statesmen
represent personal beliefs, their constituents' views, the views of soci-
ety at large, or some combination of all three, and to what degree this
should influence current congressional action.88
On one end of the originalist spectrum, Justice Antonin Scalia
would refer to the legislative record of the Thirteenth Amendment
only where it represents nineteenth-century public thought.89 Given
that the views of women and minorities are largely absent from these
records, an assessment of nineteenth-century public thought solely
based on official legislative records is incomplete. In addition, the
Thirteenth Amendment legislative discussion occurred within a coun-
try divided by the Civil War, leading to a congressional record that
reflects the views of radical northern Republicans. 90 It is also difficult
to exclusively rely on legislative history when nineteenth-century ex-
pectations concerning the abolition of slavery never contemplated
twenty-first century global labor interactions.91 Therefore, a constitu-
tional interpretive method that provides a comprehensive, yet limiting
and workable, Thirteenth Amendment analysis is necessary. This
method is process theory.
B. Process Theory Characterizes the Constitution as Primarily
Preoccupied with Procedural Fairness
John Hart Ely revitalized constitutional scholarship by interpret-
ing the Constitution as predominantly focused on procedure and
structure rather than on substantive rights. 92 Ely's theory is known as
process theory and views the search for fundamental rights within the
Constitution as elusive and overly discretionary. 93 Ely's interpretation
of the Constitution advocates for heightened procedural protections
to protect vulnerable groups within society rather than establishing a
88. See Ronald Dworkin, Comment in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAw 115, 115-18 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (commenting on Justice Antonin
Scalia's essay, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts
in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, within the same collection of works).
89. See id. at 118.
90. See VanderVelde, supra note 4, at 495-96.
91. See Dworkin, supra note 88, at 118.
92. See ELY, supra note 9, at 92.
93. See id. at 73.
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concrete list of fundamental rights. 94 Process theory interprets the
Constitution as providing "procedural fairness in the resolution of in-
dividual disputes ... [and] with ensuring broad participation in the
processes of distributions of government. 95 Instead of asking whether
a fundamental right is at stake, process theory inquires whether the
procedures underlying a set of democratic outcomes are fair.96
By in large, majority rule is the principal governmental proce-
dure in the United States.9 7 Even with carefully-crafted checks and
balances, American democracy frequently fails to protect vulnerable,
isolated, and unpopular minority groups where such groups have no
avenue to affect power.98 In United States v. Carolene Products,99 the Su-
preme Court pointed out that popular democracy may often threaten
a small and insular minority's ability to participate in society, 100 lead-
ing to the tyranny of the majority.10 To protect minorities against the
majority's injustices, process theory aims to ensure accessible political
communication and participation for all members in society and to
maintain "these processes free of prejudice against discreet [sic] and
insular minorities. '1 0 2
Process theory supports the claim that the Constitution is prima-
rily procedural by focusing on the overarching structure of American
government as set out in the Constitution. 10 3 From balancing federal
and state power to apportioning responsibility between the executive,
judiciary, and the legislature, the Constitution repeatedly promotes
procedures that guarantee separation of powers.' 0 4 This prevents one
faction within government from monopolizing power to the nation's
detriment.10 5 For example, Article IV's Privileges and Immunities
Clause and the Commerce Clause protect out-of-state citizens and
goods from in-state prejudices and monopolies. 10 6 The Ex Post Facto
94. See id. at 80 (quoting Madison's Federalist 51, which warned of the injustice
wrought on minorities where an unjust majority asserts its will upon all members of
society).
95. Id. at 87.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 78.
98. Id.
99. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
100. Id. at 152-53 n.4.
101. See ELY, supra note 9, at 75-80.
102. James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REv. 211, 228
(1993).
103. See ELY, supra note 9, at 79-80; see also Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
104. See ELY, supra note 9, at 79-80.
105. Id. at 80.
106. Id. at 83.
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and Bill of Attainder Clauses deal with separation of powers. 107 In fact,
the Bill of Rights, popularly perceived as substantive, contains overrid-
ing procedural components. 108 The Fifth through the Eighth Amend-
ments involve judicial procedure. 109 Even First Amendment free
speech concerns stem from fears that the political process will break
down unless ideas flow freely. 110 Ely also reinforces his assertion that
the Constitution is, at heart, a procedural document by characterizing
Supreme Court decisions under the Warren Court not as creations of
new substantive rights, but rather as procedural commands to apply
governmental protections to everyone.11'
Within constitutional provisions that protect individual rights,
such as the Thirteenth Amendment, process theory compels courts to
invalidate legislation where procedural malfunctions exacerbate
rights-based violations. 112 The Thirteenth Amendment undoubtedly
has a procedural component: slaves did not and legally could not offi-
cially participate in the political process. 13 Thus, Congress cannot ad-
equately abolish the badges and incidents of slavery without focusing
on the procedural breakdowns that fuel them.
Determining whether labor situations should give rise to congres-
sional action pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment requires analyz-
ing slavery-like abuses and the procedural protections afforded to
employers and employees. Re-examining this section's previous dis-
cussion on current practices that may constitute a badge or incident
of slavery,114 Congress should assess the procedural protections pro-
vided to the participating parties-such as meaningful access to the
legislative process-as well as consult history and case law before inter-
fering with labor relationships under the Thirteenth Amendment.
This additional procedural analysis would help Congress define the
107. Id. at 90.
108. See id. at 93.
109. Id. at 95.
110. Id. at 90.
111. Id. at 73-74. Warren Court opinions concerning voter qualification and malap-
portionment are examples of procedural commands to apply governmental protections to
everyone. Id.
112. See Fleming, supra note 102, at 224.
113. See ELY, supra note 9, at 98.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 83-87 (noting that employees who feel forced
to remain in unwanted jobs, military-induced family disruption, and reproductive practices
that commoditize women may conceivably constitute modern instances of slavery's badges
and incidents).
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scope of Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment, avoiding the pit-
falls referenced in Kozminski.1 " 5
Process theory focuses on procedural fairness rather than sub-
stantive rights,11 6 demanding heightened scrutiny for discrete and in-
sular minorities.' 17 Next, this Comment explores past and current
guestworker programs as an example of borderline situations impli-
cating the Thirteenth Amendment. When viewed through a process
theory lens, however, these interrelated guestworker programs de-
mand congressional action under the Thirteenth Amendment.
III. Past and Present Guestworker Programs Confirm that
Insular, Discrete, and Vulnerable Agricultural
Laborers with Minimal Political Influence Are
Susceptible to Slavery-like Victimization
Guestworker programs represent a compromise between employ-
ers who desire cheap foreign labor to fill undesirable jobs and native
populations reluctant to bestow citizenship rights on foreign work-
ers. 1 8 To appease both groups, governments worldwide have devised
restrictive temporary work programs.' 19 With few in government look-
ing out for the interests of guestworkers,120 history is replete with ex-
amples of guestworker abuse.1 21 Where United States guestworkers
suffer slavery-like abuses and have inadequate mechanisms to affect
governmental processes, Congress should utilize Section Two of the
Thirteenth Amendment to require guestworker participation in the
crafting of guestworker policy.
115. 487 U.S. 931, 943-44, 964, 967 (1987) (Brennan & Stevens, JJ., concurring) (fear-
ing that an overly expansive interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment could lead to
children challenging the custody of their parents and religious indoctrination claims).
116. See ELY, supra note 9, at 92.
117. See Fleming, supra note 102, at 228 (describing Ely's process-perfecting theory of
judicial review).
118. See Hahamovitch, supra note 10, at 72-73.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 73, 76.
121. See id. at 76-84.
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A. The Bracero Program: As Governmental Representation of
Mexican Guestworkers Declined, Slavery-like Abuses
Surfaced
1. Braceros Became a Discrete and Insular Minority Isolated from
the Political Processes Shaping Their Employment
Conditions
World War Two ("WWII") gave rise to the Bracero Program
("Program"), 122 a bilateral negotiation between Mexico and the
United States that legally sent Mexican agricultural employees to work
on American farms.' 2 3 Implemented on August 4, 1942, the Program
lasted until 1964.124 The last years of the Program witnessed egregious
labor violations 2 5 that replicated the badges and incidents of slavery
and reflected a breakdown in the Program's procedural fairness. 126
During WWII, the United States faced an unusually vulnerable
bargaining position in relation to Mexico, as it desperately needed
Mexican labor to fuel the war effort. 127 The United States' weak bar-
gaining position permitted Mexico to demand certain labor protec-
tions for its citizens. 128 The United States agreed to act as the
Braceros' employer 129 and bore the responsibility of ensuring compli-
ance with all employment contracts within the Program.1 30 These con-
tracts guaranteed sanitary housing and the prevailing wage for the
crops harvested.' 3 '
122. Bracero derives from the Spanish "brazos," and means "arms." Cassell's Spanish-
English Dictionary 110 (1978). Mexican migrants were called Braceros, as both govern-
ments attested that the name symbolized a collective United States-Mexican valuation of
Mexican labor. See Cohen, supra note 18, at 111.
123. See Cohen, supra note 18, at 113.
124. Id. at 110.
125. See Manuel Pastor & Susan Alva, Guest Workers and the New Transnationalism: Pos-
sibilities and Realities in an Age of Repression, 31 Soc. JUST. 92, 95 n.1-2 (2004). Ernesto Ga-
larza's important 1956 report, Strangers in Our Fields, and the well regarded Edward R.
Murrow 1960 documentary, Harvest of Shame, exposed widespread abuse of Mexican mi-
grants in the Bracero Program. Id.
126. See Cohen, supra note 18, at 116. Once the United States and Mexico withdrew
from directly managing the Program, growers became responsible for the welfare of
Braceros from whose labor they profited. Id. Forcing the Program's workers to appeal to
those who were abusing them represented a collapse in the Program's procedural fairness.
See id.
127. Id. at 115.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 113.
131. Id.
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Both Mexico and the United States gravely underestimated the
desire of some Mexicans to earn a livelihood in the United States.1 32
Soon, neither country could curb the flood of Mexicans illegally en-
tering and working in the United States.1 33 Mexico lost much of its
ability to represent and negotiate fair labor practices for its citizens,
since many Mexicans were working outside any labor arrangement
over which Mexico could assert control. 34 Private United States em-
ployers, on the other hand, benefited from this excess supply of Mexi-
can workers as they could pay non-Bracero laborers less and evade the
Program's fair wages and guaranteed housing mandates. a35
The United States government's refusal to continue as an em-
ployer and the reduction in Mexico's ability to represent and protect
its citizens working in the United States initiated the decline in labor
standards for Mexicans legally employed under the Program. 136 In the
late 1940s, the United States transferred management of the Program
to private employers.' 37 These private employers now controlled the
terms and conditions for legal authorization for foreign work on
United States' farms. 138 Employers faced little pressure to uphold la-
bor standards because they could threaten workers who complained
about conditions in the fields with deportation or replace such work-
ers with an abundant supply of undocumented help.13 9 Furthermore,
though many Mexican officials wanted to protect Braceros, they also
feared that if they persistently protested Program labor conditions,
they would lose remittances generated by the Program's work oppor-
tunities. 140 Thus, Braceros could neither look towards the United
States nor Mexico for labor protection, and the result was rampant
labor abuse' 41
In addition to a lack of effective government representation, at
the height of the Program in 1955, Braceros only numbered 400,000,
132. Id. at 115-16.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 115.
136. Id.; see also Hahamovitch, supra note 10, at 82-83.
137. See Cohen, supra note 18, at 116.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 115-16; see also Hahamovitch, supra note 10, at 82-83.
140. See Hahamovitch, supra note 10, at 83. Remittances refer to the money that mi-
grants earn in the United States and then send back to their native country. DEBORAH
WALLER MEYERS, MIGRANT REMITTANCES TO LATIN AMERICA: REVIEWING THE LITERATURE
(MAY 1998) (non-numbered working paper, on file with The Tom.s Rivera Policy Insti-
tute), available at http://www.iadialog.org/publications/meyers.html.
141. Cohen, supra note 18, at 116.
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a .fraction of the United States population.142 As a discrete minority
insulated from the political process, Braceros had no access to conven-
tional democratic protections. 143 Through a process theory lens, this
collapse in democratic protections should have raised congressional
concern about procedural fairness towards Mexican migrants. The
lack of procedural fairness served as both a cause and an effect of
Bracero labor abuse.
2. The Braceros' Discrete, Insular, and Minority Status Required
Heightened Scrutiny of the Program's Labor Abuses
The Supreme Court has already declared that purely private ra-
cial discrimination in housing constitutes a badge and incident of slav-
ery.' 44 Congressional authority to determine and abolish the badges
and incidents of slavery145 extends to labor, familial, political, and citi-
zenship issues. 146 Given the breakdown in democratic protections for
Braceros, Congress should have closely scrutinized labor abuses di-
rected at Braceros and found that these abuses constituted badges and
incidents of slavery.
Employer control over Braceros translated to unreasonable
wages, increased commoditization of Braceros, and other labor
abuses. 147 The Bracero Program permitted the American Southwest to
become an agricultural powerhouse. 148 California fruit and vegetable
production rose sharply in the 1950s.149 However, the average farm
worker's earnings barely increased. Agricultural wages rose from $0.85
an hour in 1950 to $1.20 an hour in 1960, while factory workers' wages
increased from $1.60 to $2.60 an hour. 150 Farm wages fell from fifty-
three percent to forty-six percent of factory wages during the 1950s.15 1
Wages equal to less than fifty percent of other working class sectors
indicate that Braceros were not earning a reasonable wage, particu-
larly since many of them were supporting families back in Mexico.1 52
A failure to provide Braceros reasonable wages prevented them from
142. Id.; see also Pastor & Alva, supra note 125, at 95.
143. See Cohen, supra note 18, at 115-16; see also Hahamovitch, supra note 10, at 82-83.
144. Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438-41 (1968).
145. Id. at 439 (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)).
146. See supra Part I.A.
147. See Cohen, supra note 18, at 116.
148. See Philip Martin, Mexican Workers and U.S. Agriculture: The Revolving Door, 36 INT'L




152. See Hahamovitch, supra note 10, at 86; see also Cohen, supra note 18, at 115.
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enjoying the fruits of their labor and infringed upon their liberty and
freedom by ensnaring them in a perpetual state of poverty. 153
During the 1950s, Mexican and American newspapers often por-
trayed the Program as discriminatory and exploitative. 154 Ernesto Ga-
larza's groundbreaking study, Strangers in OurFields, and an influential
1960 documentary film titled Harvest of Shame documented a sharp
reduction in Program wages through extortion-like charges for meals
and housing maintenance fees. 155 To this day, ex-Braceros are seeking
legal remedies to recover earned wages that were withheld. 156 Viewed
in the aggregate, unreasonable wages and the denial of full pay sug-
gest that some agricultural owners disregarded the desires and well-
being of Braceros, leading to indifference and abuse. Thus, the
Bracero Program perpetuated an unhealthy cycle of commoditization
of foreign labor. Low Program wages and corresponding labor abuse
constituted badges and incidents of slavery.
In 1953, Senator Eugene McCarthy publicly condemned the
abuses of the Bracero Program during congressional hearings.
157
Most senators, however, advocated terminating existing subsidies and
safeguards for Braceros as it was evident that the United States did not
need the Program to encourage Mexicans to work in the United
States. 158 Senator McCarthy's comments and widespread calls to end
the Program underscore the fact that there was awareness in the
United States of Bracero abuse and that the Braceros were politically
vulnerable.
American slavery tore apart the African-American family, an injus-
tice the drafters of the Thirteenth Amendment aimed to eradicate. 159
Similarly, the Bracero Program prevented male Braceros from bring-
ing their spouses to the United States, forcing Mexican families to sep-
arate. 160 Women migrants could bear children, increasing the
likelihood that guestworker families would permanently remain in the
United States, an outcome the Program wished to avoid. 161 Addition-
ally, an all-male Program allowed employers to offer lower wages since
153. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
154. See Cohen, supra note 18, at 123.
155. See Pastor & Alva, supra note 125, at 95.
156. Id.
157. See Cohen, supra note 18, at 122.
158. Id. at 122-23.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42; see also VanderVelde, supra note 4, at 440
n.16.
160. See Hahamovitch, supra note 10, at 86.
161. See id.
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Braceros' families shouldered the costs of survival in Mexico. 62 The
continuous stream of Mexicans crossing into the United States sig-
naled the difficulty of surviving in rural Mexico. 163 Thus, many
Braceros sent their wages back to Mexico to support their families. 164
With dependent families and an agricultural crisis exacerbating ex-
isting rural poverty in Mexico, losing employment was not an option
for many Braceros.165 The economic and labor consequences stem-
ming from the disruption to the family life of Braceros differed from
the permanent separation of family members that often occurred dur-
ing nineteenth-century American slavery. 1 66 Nonetheless, the extent
of the hardships and additional pressures the Program's familial sepa-
ration placed on the Bracero and his family represented a badge and
incident of slavery.
Braceros, facing unreasonably low wages, commoditization, labor
abuses, and familial separation, confronted two unattractive alterna-
tives: complain and risk losing authorization to work in the United
States, which would make them even more susceptible to exploitation
as illegal workers, or return to Mexico. 16 7 Tying legal immigration sta-
tus to employment necessarily led to a decline in labor rights, since
the threat of deportation often silenced any demands for employee
rights. 1 68 As the Supreme Court clarified in Kozminski, "it is possible
that threatening . . an immigrant with deportation could constitute
the threat of legal coercion that induces involuntary servitude."'169
Therefore, upon a showing that deportation amounted to a Bracero's
inability to support himself and his family, there is a strong claim that
incidents within the Program violated Section One of the Thirteenth
Amendment.17 0
As for Section Two, 1 7 1 the Program's breakdown in procedural
fairness should have led Congress to view the unreasonably low pay of
162. Id.
163. See Cohen, supra note 18, at 122.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 115.
166. See STEVEN MiNTz, HUCK'S RAFT: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CHILDHOOD 95 (Belknap
Press 2004) (discussing instances of permanent familial separation during American
slavery).
167. See Cohen, supra note 18, at 123.
168. See Hahamovitch, supra note 10, at 82-83.
169. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 948 (1988).
170. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § I ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
171. Id. § 2 ("Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.").
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Braceros, their commoditization, and their diminished labor and fam-
ily rights as badges and incidents of slavery demanding government
action. This would have provided process theory-inspired Thirteenth
Amendment precedent in both labor and immigration issues for fu-
ture cases. Although Congress missed an opportunity to use a process
theory application of the Thirteenth Amendment to abolish labor
abuses during the Bracero Program, now is the ideal time to resurrect
process theory and the Thirteenth Amendment in order to shape
guestworker policy today. 172
B. The Current United States Guestworker Program Perpetuates
the Bracero Program's Procedural Flaws and Labor
Abuses, Requiring Congressional Action Under
the Thirteenth Amendment
1. Employer Control of the Current Program Creates Procedural
Unfairness
Modeled after the Bracero Program, the most recent United
States agricultural guestworker visa program ("H-2A Program") began
in 1986.173 The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
("USCIS") allows employers to legally hire non-Americans by issuing
nonimmigrant employment visas. 174 Migrants learn about H-2A visas
172. See Randal C. Archibold, Planned Boycott Evolves into Protests, N.Y. TIMES, May 2,
2006, at Al. Hundreds of thousands of immigrants left work and school and boycotted all
economic activity from Los Angeles to New York on the first full workday of May 2006. Id.
This protest was just one of many that occurred throughout the country during the winter
and spring of 2006. Id. The boisterous but largely peaceful demonstrations protested con-
gressional immigration proposals to deport thousands of immigrant workers. Id. On a
more general level, the protests symbolized a growing immigrant rights movement de-
manding greater labor protections and political representation. See id.
173. See Martin, supra note 148, at 1131. After the Bracero Program, there was a
"golden age" of unionized agricultural work in the 1960s and 1970s led by Cesar Chavez
and the United Farm Workers. Id. at 1130. This "golden age" collapsed under poor leader-
ship, the ascendancy of the Republican Party, and rising illegal immigration. Id. at 1130.
Rising illegal immigration spurred on the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act,
which offered many unauthorized farm workers amnesty while implementing tougher bor-
der controls. Id. at 1130-31. Tougher border controls failed to stop illegal immigration. Id.
at 1131. Further unionization and increased political pressure to change agricultural wages
never materialized since employers continued to have access to a large supply of cheap,
non-unionized, and unauthorized workers. See id. at 1131-33. New and largely powerless
migrant workers entered the fields, perpetuating 1950s-style immigrant labor abuses into
the twenty-first century. See id. at 1133.
174. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Temporary Workers, http://www.uscis.
gov/graphics/services/tempbenefits/TempWorker.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2006).
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from recruiters within their home countries. 17 5 In 2003, roughly
43,000 primarily male workers lawfully labored on American agricul-
tural land.1 76
The H-2A program requires employers to petition for legal sea-
sonal and temporary agricultural workers from the Department of La-
bor ("DOL").1 7 7 The DOL certifies employers capable of showing
insufficient or unavailable American workers in a given labor field. 178
It also requires employers to demonstrate that guestworkers will not
adversely affect American wages and working conditions by undercut-
ting employment of United States citizens. 179 Additionally, employers
must provide seasonal workers with employment for seventy-five per-
cent of the work time within a given contract period as well as furnish
housing.1 80
Despite these protections, the H-2A visa forecloses any path to
lawful permanent residency, denying guestworkers protections and
political rights afforded to those with more permanent visas. 18' Also,
H-2A employers control an employee's access to legal immigration sta-
tus. 18 2 Once an employer fires a guestworker, the guestworker no
longer enjoys legal access to work and live in the United States unless
another employer sponsors him.1 8 3 None too often, employers black-
list and refuse future employment to "problem employees."1 8 4 As
some forthright employers have pointed out, "[i]f you bring a
[guestworker] into the country and he or she decides to jump ship, its
[sic] likely that the ship he or she will have to jump on is the one
that's going back to the home country." 18 5 The threat of deportation
or blacklisting chills complaints of labor abuse and may force one to
remain in a hostile work environment. 86 As articulated in Kozminski,
175. Marta Hummel, Field: Tending to Family, Not Crop, of Field and Family, NEWS & REc.
(Greensboro, N.C.), Nov. 20, 2005, at Al [hereinafter Hummel, Field].
176. Id.
177. See8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (15) (H) (ii) (a) (2000).
178. See Patricia Medige, Perspectives on the Bush Administration's New Immigrant
Guestworker Proposal: Immigrant Labor Issues, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'V, 735, 738 (2004).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See id. at 739. In contrast, the H-1B visa, often used by the computer industry,
allows the holder to bring family members to the United States and can lead to legal resi-
dency. See Pastor & Alva, supra note 125, at 99.
182. Medige, supra note 178, at 739.
183. See supra text accompany notes 177-80.
184. See Medige, supra note 178, at 739.
185. Norman Matloff, On the Need for Reform of the H-1B Non-Immigrant Work Visa in Com-
puter-Related Occupations, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 815, 866 (2000-2003).
186. See Medige, supra note 178, at 739.
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threatening deportation to compel work may alone violate the Thir-
teenth Amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude. 187 At a
minimum, employer control of a temporary visa that provides few ave-
nues to political participation and representation insulates
guestworkers from governmental protection, rendering them
vulnerable.
Legal guestworkers make up only ten percent of the number of
Braceros who were working at a given time in the 1950s. 8s Their ex-
treme minority status, coupled with their inability to formally influ-
ence United States agricultural policy or protest abuses in the field to
a neutral agency that oversees their visa status, 189 should direct Con-
gress to replace the current H-2A program.
2. H-2A Workers Face Abuses that Replicate the Badges and
Incidents of Slavery
Since political participation and representation do not meaning-
fully exist for H-2A employees, Congress should vigorously scrutinize
H-2A labor abuses and find that they constitute badges and incidents
of slavery. Congress already prohibits purely private racial discrimina-
tion in housing as a badge and incident of slavery. 190 The Amend-
ment's drafters viewed the Thirteenth Amendment as establishing
labor, familial, political, and citizenship rights,19' offering guidance
for discerning contemporary badges and incidents of slavery.
Similar to the Bracero Program, employer control over the issu-
ing of H-2A visas has led to unreasonable wages and other labor
abuses. 192 The systemic payment of unreasonable wages to H-2A work-
ers encroaches upon their liberty and freedom, trapping them in a
continual state of poverty while in the United States. 193 In addition to
employer control over the visa process, other factors drive wages
downward for today's guestworker. 194
Many employers feel that economic forces threaten the survival of
their small farms, often family-owned for generations.1 95 In North Car-
187. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 948 (1988).
188. See Cohen, supra note 18, at 116.
189. Id.
190. Jones, 392 U.S. at 438-41.
191. See supra Part I.A.
192. See Medige, supra note 178, at 739.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 136-38, 150.
194. See infra text accompany notes 197-200.
195. Marta Hummel, Farm: They Can't Do the Job Alone. A Field Out of Favor, NEWS & REc.
(Greensboro, N.C.), Nov. 19, 2005, at Al [hereinafter Hummel, Farm].
[Vol. 41
SLAVERY & AGRICULTURAL GUESTWORKERS
olina, for example, "[w]ithout government subsidies for the first
time ... tobacco farmers have no income guarantees."' 96 Some farm-
ers sell fields to real estate developers or even retire. 97 Despite low
employee wages, making ends meet is increasingly difficult for smaller
farms.'98 Notwithstanding the power to deny or grant visas, economic
fears drive some employers to abandon the guestworker program and
hire cheaper undocumented workers, thus bypassing any wage or
housing requirements. 99
For almost half a year, working six days a week without overtime
or holiday pay, the average H-2A employee in North Carolina earns
$8.24 an hour.200 These wages are below the level most Americans
find acceptable for themselves, demonstrated by the fact that many
agricultural communities have witnessed an exodus of American la-
bor.201 Many Mexicans, on the other hand, are all too eager to work
for $8.24 an hour.20 2 One day's pay in the United States equals more
than a week's wages in rural Mexico. 20 3 The huge discrepancy be-
tween wages in Mexico and the United States guarantees a large sup-
ply of Mexican labor.204 As a result, guestworkers have little leverage
to fight for higher wages, especially when employers know that wages
in Mexico are much lower and that guestworkers do not pay taxes to
the United States on their income. 20 5
In addition to unreasonable wages, H-2A work is numbing, long,
and often dangerous. 20 6 Employers pack men into buses and require
them to wear heavy clothing to protect their bodies from pesticides
despite the intense heat and oppressive humidity in many areas of the





200. Marta Hummel, N.C. Biggest User of Migrant Program: Cultivating the Land of Opportu-
nity, NEWS & REC. (Greensboro, N.C.), Oct. 2, 2005, at Al [hereinafter Hummel,
Opportunity].
201. See Medige, supra note 178, at 738; see also Marta Hummel, Union Grows in the Fields,
NEWS & REC. (Greensboro, N.C.), Nov. 6, 2005, at Al; Molly Hennesy-Fiske, Migrant Workers
Fill Necessary Niche; Thousands Come from South of U.S. Border to Harvest Crops for America's
Farms, POST- STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Oct. 9, 2005, at B1.
202. Hummel, Field, supra note 175.
203. Id.
204. See id.
205. See Hummel, Farm, supra note 195; Hummel, Field, supra note 175.
206. See Hummel, Opportunity, supra note 200.
207. See id.
Fall 2006]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
employee may return to inadequate housing.20 8 Mandated by the H-
2A program to provide housing,20 9 some employers undoubtedly do
their best to erect satisfactory housing.210 In many instances, however,
dwellings are "cramped and sparse,"211 raising safety concerns. In New
York, a propane gas explosion killed several men in a guestworker
dwelling.212 Their families, and not the employer, reportedly paid for
the burial costs to return the bodies to Mexico. 213
By separating families, the current H-2A scheme, like the Bracero
Program before it, replicates a harm associated with slavery. 214 De-
signed for sojourns, the H-2A program prohibits workers from bring-
ing family members to the United States unless a family member can
acquire an additional and independent visa.215 In practice, H-2A
spousal policies force many women throughout Mexico to raise fami-
lies alone as their husbands forge north to work in the United States
for four to six months each year.216 In many towns across Mexico,
men are absent. 217 Mothers take charge of families as husbands and
sons earn money in the United States to carve out a more economi-
cally fulfilling life. 218 Gervacio Martinez, a H-2A visa holder, sums up a
common sentiment: he "wish[es] [his family] could be together all
the time, but it is legally impossible at the moment."21 9 H-2A legal
barriers to spousal employment access effectively divide families and
constitute a modern example of slavery's legacy of familial separation.
Like the Braceros before them, H-2A employees are a vulnerable,
insular, and discrete minority. Under process theory, this minority sta-
tus requires heightened congressional review of the program. Unrea-
sonable wages, inadequate housing, and familial separation within the
program replicate the badges and incidents of slavery, interfering with
substantive rights protected by the Thirteenth Amendment. Subject to
intensified scrutiny, these discredited labor conditions call for con-
gressional reform pursuant to Section Two of the Thirteenth Amend-
208. Id.; see also Hennesy-Fiske, supra note 201.
209. See Medige, supra note 178.
210. See Hummel, Farm, supra note 195.
211. See Hummel, Opportunity, supra note 200; see also Hennesy-Fiske, supra note 201.
212. Hennesy-Fiske, supra note 201.
213. Id.
214. See supra text accompany notes 159-66.
215. See Pastor & Alva, supra note 125, at 99.
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ment. A brief discussion regarding what these revisions might
encompass follows.
C. Proposal: Federal Legislation Mandating Guestworker Employee
Participation During Policy Making
In light of congressional authority under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment to eradicate the badges and incidents of slavery,2 20 proposed
guestworker legislation must include continual guestworker represen-
tation throughout the life of the temporary work visa program. As this
Comment has revealed, a complete denial of political and citizenship
rights erodes basic protections for guestworkers, including representa-
tion within government and government protection from employer
abuse.
Also, because employer abuse may lead to labor practices that
replicate the badges and incidents of slavery, Congress should imple-
ment procedures that require guestworker employee review of and
commentary on all newly proposed or modified guestworker legisla-
tion. Instead of being politically isolated and vulnerable, direct partici-
pation in the crafting of guestworker policy would guarantee
guestworkers a meaningful voice regarding the conditions that shape
their lives in the United States.
In fact, the International Labour Organization ("ILO") 22t already
requires employee participation for member nations drafting and im-
plementing labor law and social policy. 222 The ILO aspires to ensure
that the global economy benefits everyone, including employees. 223
Employee participation would encourage guestworkers to tackle labor
practices within the guestworker program before they transform into
labor abuses, as well as address process theory concerns regarding pro-
cedural fairness. By procedurally securing guestworker influence over
policy, employer-controlled immigration status, unreasonable wages,
220. SeeJones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438-44 (1968).
221. International Labour Organization: International Labour Standards: Introduction
to ILS, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/introduction/index.htm
(last visited Nov. 1, 2006) [hereinafter ILO Introduction]. "Since 1919, the International
Labour Organization has maintained and developed a system of international labour stan-
dards aimed at promoting opportunities for women and men to obtain decent and produc-
tive work, in conditions of freedom, equity, security and dignity." Id.
222. International Labour Organization: International Labour Standards: How ILS Are
Used, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/introduction/used.htm (last
visited Aug. 25, 2006).
223. See ILO Introduction, supra note 221.
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and spousal rules that force families to remain apart for significant
portions of the year would likely disappear.
While mandated guestworker employee participation does not
exhaust available legislative possibilities available to Congress under
the authority of the Thirteenth Amendment, it provides a glimpse of
the human rights possibilities within the Thirteenth Amendment.
IV. Conclusion
Legal scholars have made impressive strides in clarifying the
proper scope and potential of the Thirteenth Amendment. Moreover,
reassessment of the badges and incidents of slavery has already influ-
enced Supreme Court decisions regarding Thirteenth Amendment
congressional authority, leading to federal legislation prohibiting
purely private racial discrimination in housing. However, the Thir-
teenth Amendment allows for even more progressive civil-rights legis-
lation when viewed through a process theory lens. Applied to
borderline cases replicating the badges and incidents of slavery, such
as past and current United States guestworker programs, process the-
ory demands congressional action pursuant to the Thirteenth
Amendment.
(Vol. 41
